Statement by
Ambassador Tehmina Janjua
Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the
United Nations in Geneva
and Conference on Disarmament

at the

Thematic Debate on Nuclear Weapons

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Statement by Ambassador Tehmina Janjua, Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva and Conference on Disarmament at the First Committee Thematic Debate on Nuclear Weapons (20 October 2015)

Chairperson,

The global struggle to regulate nuclear weapons through legal, normative and political means has been largely perceived as unsuccessful. Despite reductions in the number of nuclear weapons since the end of cold war, the pace has been slow and the scale modest.

Advancement towards multilateral nuclear disarmament is being resisted by a handful of Nuclear Weapon States. These States are neither willing to give up their large inventories of nuclear weapons nor their modernization programmes. Such duplicity only aggravates the sense of insecurity among states.

Instead of fulfilling their legal disarmament obligations, these States have almost exclusively pursued non-proliferation. This gap in legality and reality has eroded the global faith in the mutually reinforcing nature of these processes.

Chairperson,

Moreover, close to 30 NPT States which are members of nuclear-armed alliances continue to rely robustly on nuclear weapons, some of them even housing tactical nuclear weapons on their territories. As such these states indirectly and implicitly encourage the possession or even use of nuclear weapons as part of the strategic doctrines of their alliances. Even as these States enjoy nuclear umbrella, they call on others to eschew means to defend themselves in the face of real security threats.

Some of these States have concluded discriminatory nuclear cooperation agreements and helped grant waivers from long-held non-proliferation principles. While professing strict adherence to responsible arms transfers, some of these States continue to supply increasing number of conventional weapons in our region, thereby aggravating instability in South Asia. These policies and actions are obviously driven by self-serving strategic, security, political and commercial considerations.

Not surprisingly, pursuit of these double standards has engendered a wide sense of dissatisfaction in the international community including in my country. Many therefore see advocacy by these States for a world free of nuclear weapons and high standards for arms transfers as empty rhetoric.

Chairperson,

Pakistan shares the concerns and anxieties associated with humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. We have therefore participated and contributed to this discourse during all the three Conferences on this subject. We also understand and sympathize with the sense of frustration among non-nuclear weapons states over the slow pace of nuclear disarmament obligations by nuclear weapons states.

At the same time, Pakistan believes that the subject of nuclear weapons, while relevant and important, cannot exclusively be reduced to the paradigm of humanitarian dimension. It is important to recognize the context and motivation of each State possessing such weapons. In the case of Pakistan, our security was qualitatively challenged by the introduction of nuclear weapons in
our region. Pakistan was left with no option but to acquire a credible nuclear deterrent capability to defend ourselves.

I also wish to remind this Committee that Pakistan advocated for nearly a quarter century a nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia. This very Committee adopted resolutions to this effect until these resolutions were defied, without any cost, and our region was nuclearized again. Faced with existential threat to our security, Pakistan demonstrated its capability to defend itself, as provided in the UN charter.

Pakistan firmly believes in the right of every State to equal security. This principle was adopted universally by SSOD-I both in the non-conventional and conventional fields and at regional as well as international levels. We consider this principle as an essential prerequisite for consideration of efforts towards nuclear disarmament or humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons.

Similarly, it is also vital to address the motives which drive States to acquire weapons including nuclear weapons to defend themselves. These motives include perceived threats from larger conventional or non-conventional forces; the existence of disputes and conflicts with more powerful States; and discrimination in the application of international norms and laws.

We therefore continue to underscore the continuing validity of another cardinal principle of SSOD-I i.e. in the adoption of disarmament measures, the right of each state to security should be kept in mind and that, at each stage of the disarmament process “the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.”

**Chairperson,**

There has been an ongoing debate on the most effective approach to nuclear disarmament. Some states advocate a step-by-step approach leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons at an undefined future date. Some other states, mostly those relying on extended nuclear deterrence, have advanced the building blocks approach, comprising a set of mutually reinforcing unilateral, bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral measures for nuclear disarmament.

NAM members, on the other hand, prefer a direct and comprehensive approach for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe. A comprehensive nuclear weapons convention would prohibit the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and provide for their destruction.

**Chairperson,**

The fragmentation of this Committee’s agenda and discourse is a clear indicator of deep differences of perspective, approach and modalities among member states to deal with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

The global consensus that the General Assembly reached thirty seven years ago through SSOD-I to address these issues has broken down and the shared goal of nuclear disarmament has become more elusive. Following developments testify to these assertions:

- **One,** opposition by most of the NPT Nuclear Weapon States to negotiations on a Nuclear Disarmament Convention;
- **Two,** the prolonged non-entry into force of the CTBT, and prospects of new tests by some States;
• **Three**, the continuing reliance of nuclear weapons in the security doctrines of some states and the threats to use nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear-weapon States;
• **Four**, pursuit of selective non-proliferation measures, nuclear exceptionalism and discriminatory conditions for peaceful nuclear cooperation;
• **Five**, pursuit of doctrines for use of conventional weapons even where nuclear deterrence exists.
• **Six**, growing asymmetry in military power among States aggravated by the dangerous trend of granting waivers and exemptions from long-held non-proliferation principles in certain regions – especially South Asia;
• **Seven**, the danger of acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction by terrorists and other non-state actors;
• **Eight**, the inability of the disarmament machinery to evolve consensus on any of the issues that are on its agenda;

Chairperson,

It is evident that the progress towards nuclear disarmament is being delayed by some who wish to divert the Conference on Disarmament’s focus to partial non-proliferation measures like an FMCT. A treaty that is discriminatory in nature and does not address the existing stockpiles of fissile materials would impinge on security of some states while being completely cost free for those with the largest amounts of fissile material stocks.

Claims by some delegations that an FMCT would put a quantitative cap on nuclear weapons are false. The reasons are self-evident; because the vast stockpiles of fissile material, coupled with the continued unsafeguarded production for civilian and non-explosive military purposes, provide a ready reserve of fissile material that can be weaponized at will. There is no provision in the treaty favoured by these states that would constrain a quantitative or qualitative increase in nuclear weapons.

Chairperson,

We wish to reiterate that the establishment of a Group of Governmental Experts on FMCT was an ill-conceived experiment. It failed to produce any consensus recommendation worth any substance including on the very objectives and scope of the treaty. The GGE simply duplicated the CD’s work in a non-inclusive body, without bringing any added value to this issue. Pakistan does not support weakening of the CD’s role through UNGA led non-universal processes that are divisive and not agreed by consensus.

In our view, the discussion mandate of this GGE could easily have been fulfilled in the CD. This fact was demonstrated during the informal discussions on fissile materials production ban in the CD, held under the Schedule of Activities last year. These informal discussions were substantive and held in a representative body with the participation of all stakeholders, thus having greater relevance and legitimacy.

Pakistan, therefore, is not in a position to accept any conclusion or recommendation produced by this GGE, including the assertion that the report can form the basis for further consideration of the FMCT issue by the CD. The GGE did not function under a mandate of the CD. The GGE members, individually or collectively, cannot arrogate to themselves the right to decide how the CD should consider the issue of fissile material.
Pakistan has recently presented a working paper in the CD on the “Elements of Fissile Material Treaty (FMT)” that reflects the required balance between disarmament and non-proliferation goals of such a treaty. I would like to highlight the contours of that working paper here:

- A balanced FMT should be rooted in the established principles of SSOD-I; it should ensure that at each stage of the disarmament process the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

- The treaty should cover past production or existing stockpiles of fissile materials in order to address the asymmetries in fissile material holdings at the regional and global levels.

- It should be non-discriminatory in nature. All states parties should assume equal obligations under the treaty without any preferential treatment for any category of states. It is also important for the treaty to be free of any loopholes.

- The treaty should provide for a robust verification mechanism entrusted to a representative and independent treaty body.

- It should promote both regional and global stability and enhance confidence among states parties.

- It should not effect in any way, the recognized and inalienable right of states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

- Lastly, the treaty should be negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament which is the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum.

I invite all the member states to consider this paper which can provide a way forward of furthering nuclear disarmament agenda.

Chairperson,

We wish to reiterate that the CD should not be made hostage to one issue and we should devote equal if not greater attention to the commencement of negotiations on other issues on the Conference’s agenda including Nuclear Disarmament, the raison d’être of the CD, Negative Security Assurances and the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. We await hearing any argument against negotiations on these agenda items based on the security interests of states. Draft treaties submitted by different delegations exist on each one of these three issues as well.

Pakistan, along with a vast majority of UN Member-States believes that the issue of negative security assurances is ripe for negotiations at the CD and will contribute to easing of current strains on the wider disarmament and non-proliferation agenda.

Chairperson,

During this session, Pakistan will be presenting its traditional draft resolution entitled: “Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”, on behalf of a large number of co-sponsoring states.
The draft reaffirms the urgent need to reach an early agreement of effective international arrangements on negative security assurances, while noting with satisfaction that there is no objection in principle to the idea of an international convention on this subject. It recommends to the Conference on Disarmament to actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement on negative security assurances.

We look forward to the adoption of this draft resolution with the widest possible support.

In the interest of saving time, I have read out the short version of my statement. I request that full text of this statement may be included in the official records.

Thank you, Chairperson.