Mr. Chair,

Germany fully aligns itself with the statement by the EU.

On behalf of Germany, let me congratulate you on assuming the chairmanship of the First Committee. Be assured of Germany's full support for your work.

Mr. Chair,

We begin this year's deliberations in the First Committee while the global political landscape continues to undergo profound changes. Geopolitical rivalry is on the rise and new technologies are evolving, creating new challenges to our common security. Arms control has increasingly come under pressure, which makes today's world a less secure place. We need to do our utmost to reverse this disquieting trend and find our way back to more cooperative action.
Mr. Chair,

1. Next year in New York, we will mark the 50th anniversary of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Undoubtedly, the NPT is a success story of multilateralism and yet we know: This landmark treaty stands at the crossroads.

2. The NPT is based on and viable only with its three equally important pillars: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We must renew our commitment to the NPT comprehensively and thereby lay the ground for its future.

3. In the current security environment, reducing the risks of inadvertent escalation is the call of the day. Maximum transparency on arsenals, military restraint and a dialogue on threat perceptions and doctrines may help to defuse the current tensions. However, risk reduction measures must not replace nuclear disarmament, but be aimed at facilitating it.

4. Germany remains fully committed to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. We are convinced that this objective can be reached through concrete cooperative steps, building on dialogue between NWS and NNWS.

5. That is why, in April, Foreign Minister Heiko Maas has convened a meeting of the Security Council in support of the NPT. And it is also why we strongly support the Swedish Initiative to reinvigorate nuclear disarmament under the NPT. Furthermore, Germany and France have jointly hosted a verification exercise just recently. Because a world without nuclear weapons can neither be achieved, nor can it be stable, without effective multilateral disarmament verification.

6. The NPT is the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation order, with numerous arrangements tied into it. The CTBT conference, co-chaired just two weeks ago by Foreign Minister Maas and his Algerian counterpart here in New York, was an impressive manifestation of support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its entry into force. We call again on all States that have not signed and ratified the Treaty to do so without preconditions or delay. Pending entry into force, we must ensure that all States maintain their moratoria on nuclear testing and refrain from any action contrary to the objectives and purpose of the Treaty.

7. Also on FMCT, we have been biding time for far too long. It is high time that we remove the obstacles and start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Differences on certain aspects of an FMCT must no longer serve as a pretext for not moving forward.

8. New START has reduced the two largest nuclear arsenals, set a new verification standard and helped containing a global nuclear arms race. We call on the US
and Russia to show leadership by extending New START and subsequently adjusting it to new developments. This would credibly underpin the commitment to Art. VI of the NPT.

Mr. Chair,

9. North Korea's latest ballistic missile tests constitute flagrant violations of UNSC resolutions. Opposing these provocations is a matter of credibility for the NPT and the global non-proliferation efforts at large. We condemn these tests in the strongest terms and we remain fully supportive of US diplomatic efforts. [...] North Korea must now undertake concrete and credible steps leading to the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear program.

10. Germany remains fully committed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a key contribution to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and an essential security asset for the region and beyond. We regret the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the further re-imposition of sanctions against Iran by the US. Germany is deeply concerned over Iran's decision to no longer implement several of the central provisions under the nuclear agreement. We strongly urge Iran to reverse this decision and to refrain from any further steps that would hollow out its JCPOA commitments. We clearly call on Iran to return to full compliance without delay. Furthermore, it is crucial that Iran extend full cooperation to the IAEA on all relevant matters, including with regard to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.

11. Germany reiterates its call on Iran to refrain from ballistic missile activities, including missile tests and launches, that would be inconsistent with UNSCR 2231, Annex B. Moreover, we urge Iran to cease transfers of missiles and missile technology to states and non-state actors in the region, in violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

Mr. Chair,

12. The world seems to be at the beginning of a new arms race, fueled to a considerable extent by new technologies. If left unchanged, our current arms control architecture risks being eroded by future weapons systems featuring autonomous functions, cyber-instruments or new missile technologies. In order to provide solutions to these crucial challenges, Federal Foreign Minister Maas has initiated a dialogue aimed at "Capturing Technologies" and "Rethinking Arms Control", which we hope to take forward with as many of our UN-partners as possible.
13. The use of chemical weapons is unacceptable under any circumstances. It is important that nobody, no government nor any group of non-state-actors, can count on impunity when using chemical weapons. Though being the world’s most successful disarmament agreement, the Chemical Weapons Convention has been infringed upon numerous times. Our collective challenge is to follow and enforce the rules that we have set ourselves. This includes identifying those who violate the Chemical Weapons Convention. We urge Syria to fully cooperate with the OPCW in investigating and identifying the repeated breaches of the global ban of chemical weapons on its territory. Syria must declare its entire chemical weapons program and verifiably destroy all of its chemical weapons.

14. Upholding the Biological Weapons Convention as a major pillar of the international WMD arms control and non-proliferation architecture is of great relevance in a globalized world. Rapid developments in the field of biotechnology and the life sciences need to be carefully monitored. Germany welcomes this year’s successful start of the intersessional work programme with the Meetings of Experts in August. We are glad that sufficient funds have in the meantime been made available to ensure that the Meeting of State Parties in December can go ahead as scheduled. We reiterate the proposal we had tabled as a follow-up of the Ministerial Conference “2019. Capturing Technology. Rethinking Arms Control” regarding a BTWC Scientific and Technological Experts Advisory Forum.

Mr. Chair,

15. Small arms, light weapons and their ammunition continue to fuel conflict and bloodshed across the world. They incite human suffering, violent human rights abuses and forced displacement across the globe. The effective control of Small Arms and Light Weapons and the fight against illicit firearms trafficking thus continue to play a crucial role on Germany’s agenda for humanitarian arms control. Germany is particularly looking forward to the GGE on conventional ammunition which will convene in 2020. We are confident that the GGE will come up with solutions on how the international community should address the main challenges of conventional ammunition, which are unplanned explosions and diversion of ammunition to illicit markets.

16. Germany remains strongly committed to promoting the universalization and effective implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty. The ATT is a cornerstone for regulating the global arms trade and hence, an indispensable means for preventing the illicit transfer of arms and ammunition. We welcome the in-depth discussion on gender and gender based violence held at its Fifth Conference of States Parties. We are delighted by the activities of the voluntary trust fund supporting concrete measures for access to and implementation of the Treaty.
Furthermore, we commend China on its announcement to initiate the relevant
domestic legal procedures for accession to the ATT.

Mr. Chair,

17. In the realm of cyber, we are also confronted with complex challenges that need
our attention: preserving an internet that is free, stable, secure and accessible for
all. We remain committed to enhancing the existing normative framework, in
particular through our membership of the Group of Government Experts and the
ongoing efforts of the Open-Ended Working Group to advance responsible state
behavior in Cyberspace.

18. To conclude, let me reiterate: The international arms control architecture is
under severe pressure and the challenges that we face are manifold. It depends
on us to find sustainable answers to these challenges by strengthening the rules
and instruments we have, and developing new ones where needed.

Thank you very much.