

**Statement by the United States in Cluster 2: Nonproliferation**

**Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the  
2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the  
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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Mr. Chairman,

The success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty rests on the strength of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Most fundamentally, all NPT States Party gain direct security benefits from their mutual undertakings to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Additionally, all NPT Parties can enjoy the fruits of peaceful uses of nuclear technology because of nonproliferation measures that provide confidence that these technologies will not be misused or diverted. All NPT Parties can also help build an environment conducive to greater progress on nuclear disarmament, in part by ensuring that the nonproliferation regime remains effective.

The continued success of the nonproliferation regime is not something we can take for granted. It requires our collective determination to ensure that international safeguards and export controls keep pace with changes in technology and learn from experience in responding to proliferation challenges. We will have more to say about those challenges in our statement on regional issues.

Mr. Chairman,

The NPT is the foundation of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and international safeguards and export controls are two of its cornerstones. Article III.1 of the Treaty requires states to conclude safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to help ensure that nuclear material in peaceful uses is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Article III.2 requires that safeguards be applied in connection with certain nuclear exports. However, the nonproliferation regime has evolved since the signing of the Treaty, in response to a number of challenges, including clandestine nuclear programs, illicit nuclear transfers, and advances in technology development and the rapidly increasing pace of trade.

The Additional Protocol (AP) requires states to provide expanded information about, and access to, all parts of a state's nuclear fuel cycle so that the IAEA can provide assurances that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in that state. This is in line with the verification goal set out in Article III: to ensure that safeguards are applied to all nuclear material, "with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear

weapons.” The Model AP was developed based on lessons learned from well-known cases of non-compliance and from IAEA experience in verifying the completeness of states’ declarations.

As of today, 134 countries have an AP in force, and 14 others have signed the AP. Given its widespread adoption, its intrinsic connection to the purposes of the NPT, and lessons learned from past proliferation challenges, the AP, combined with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, is the *de facto* standard for assuring compliance with the Treaty’s safeguards obligations. We commend those states that meet this standard, including most recently Liberia and Serbia, and we call on others to follow their example. We also call on states with the outdated version of the Small Quantities Protocol to modify or rescind it without delay.

Ultimately, the cost of safeguards is modest compared to the benefits they provide – both in direct security gains through preventing proliferation and reducing the risk of nuclear war, and in terms of the confidence that nonproliferation assurances can provide in facilitating peaceful nuclear cooperation and helping make the security environment more conducive to disarmament. We call on IAEA Member States to ensure that the IAEA has the resources and the political support it needs to carry out its safeguards mission and to keep pace with advancing technology and proliferation challenges.

Mr. Chairman,

By ensuring that peaceful nuclear cooperation and commerce take place under high nonproliferation standards, nuclear export controls directly advance the aims of the NPT. Alongside strong international safeguards and high standards of safety and security, they help build confidence that nuclear programs are safe, secure, and entirely peaceful. Responsible export controls facilitate the “fullest possible exchange” of nuclear material, equipment, and technology for peaceful purposes.

For this to work, however, it is important for export control standards to keep pace with safeguards standards. Suppliers that cling to outdated standards only encourage their trading partners to resist the current ones, and risk damaging the entire NPT architecture – to the collective detriment of all. It is high time for the AP to become a standard condition for nuclear cooperation. It is irresponsible to use lax nonproliferation standards as a marketing tool, and the suppliers of the world must do better than they have been doing. We call on all suppliers to join us in making the AP a requirement for nuclear exports.

Mr. Chairman,

Establishing the legal and regulatory framework, technical expertise, and institutional procedures needed for a responsible nuclear program requires adequate resources, training, and support. Fortunately, the United States and others provide training and assistance in all these areas to help states build and maintain sustainable, peaceful nuclear programs.

Mr. Chairman,

As we look to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime, building on a half century of success, we must do so with the shared understanding that our efforts, if successful, will help create the environment necessary to achieve further progress towards nuclear disarmament and to expand access to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. We can only realize the safe and secure world to which we all aspire if we work together, based on shared interests, to preserve and advance the nonproliferation regime for future generations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.