Statement

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General Debate
Mr. Chairman,

- Let me **congratulate** you to your election to the Chair of the third PrepCom. You are assuming that responsibility as we embark on the final lap towards 2020, and you can count on Germany’s **full support and cooperation**. Next year we will mark the 50\(^{th}\) anniversary of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And it will be our mission to ensure the treaty’s enduring value for the 21\(^{st}\) century.

- In an unstable security environment we must redouble our efforts to strengthen multilateralism with a viable arms-control architecture at its core. Needless to say, that treaties and arrangements must be fully implemented by all parties and throughout time to serve their purpose. That applies to the INF, the CWC and existing conventional arms control instruments all put at risk by non-compliance. Today, we are looking at the NPT.

- We all know: The stakes are high. That is why Foreign Minister Maas has convened, on 2 April, a Security Council meeting in support of the NPT, and we were encouraged to see the unanimous support expressed by UNSC members for the treaty and its mutually reinforcing commitments.

- The **NPT undeniably is one of the most remarkable success stories** of multilateral diplomacy. Without this treaty far **more states would have nuclear weapons** today. Without the NPT the world would not have acquired such high **universal safeguards standards**, as enshrined in the Additional Protocols in conjunction with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. We would not have successfully **minimized the proliferation risks** in reactor technology. And we would not have been able to spread the benefits of nuclear technology.

- What is also true: Without the NPT the **strategic nuclear arsenals** might not have been drastically reduced as compared to cold-war
levels. But the **track record in nuclear disarmament is mixed**. Notwithstanding the achievements made in a five decade perspective, progress in nuclear disarmament has come to a **standstill**. However, standstill is not sustainable for a **treaty of interrelated commitments**. To secure the future of the NPT we need a 360-degree approach to its implementation.

- **To tackle the current proliferation crises continued unity and resolve are essential. North Korea** is a case in point. Only by credibly embarking on the **path to complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization** can North Korea regain the trust of the international community. We must not allow North Korea to become a nuclear possessor state – in blatant violation of the NPT and numerous UN Security Council resolutions. Against this background, we strongly **support the US efforts** aimed at achieving meaningful progress towards denuclearization. **Sanctions pressure** was instrumental in bringing North Korea to the negotiating table and must be upheld. As **chair of the UNSC 1718 Committee** Germany will work hard to make sure that the sanctions adopted by the Security Council are **fully and duly implemented**.

- **The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action** is a diplomatic milestone and a key contribution to the nuclear non-proliferation architecture – based on the NPT. As long as Iran fully upholds its JCPoA commitments we stand clearly **committed to its preservation and continued full and effective implementation**. Through **tight restrictions** of Iran’s nuclear program and the most **robust IAEA monitoring and verification regime** in the world, the JCPoA ensures that Iran’s nuclear program can only serve peaceful purposes. This makes the JCPoA an important **asset for security in the region**, in Europe, and beyond – which we want to maintain. At the same time we call on Iran to strictly comply with all provisions of UNSCR 2231, including those pertaining to Iran’s **ballistic missile activities** and transfers of arms, including missile technology.
• Ladies and gentlemen, curbing nuclear non-proliferation and advancing nuclear disarmament are two mutually reinforcing objectives: Successful non-proliferation efforts facilitate steps towards nuclear disarmament. Stagnation on nuclear disarmament reduces the prospects for successful non-proliferation. That is why we need both alongside each other.

• The 2010 Action Plan provides an ample menu to re-engage on nuclear disarmament. Such re-engagement needs to be measured against the background of a challenging security environment. It is true: Reductions in nuclear arsenals do not automatically increase stability and security. But challenges in the security environment must not prevent us from seeking further stockpile reductions or reducing the role of nuclear weapons.

• Over the past decades reductions and limitations of nuclear stockpiles have crucially contributed to security and stability. Limitations of the two biggest strategic arsenals not only contribute to European security but also stabilize the global nuclear order. Effective arrangements like the New START Treaty should therefore be preserved and, where needed, developed further. We are convinced that further limitations are possible without any loss in security.

• Many experts assess that the risk of unintentional nuclear escalation has never been higher after the end of the cold war. Cyber threats and the risks emanating from artificial intelligence on nuclear security and nuclear systems have not been fully captured. We have only started to comprehensively assess technological developments, from outer space to cyber space, and rethink arms control against that background. On 15 March Germany hosted a first expert conference to better understand the complex interrelation between technology and arms control.

• In particular in an unstable environment, risk reduction and confidence-building measures are urgently needed. Concrete steps towards strategic risk reduction notably include enhanced transparency. I would like to remind the NWS that this Conference
offers an excellent opportunity for detailed reporting on nuclear arsenals.

- A meaningful **dialogue on nuclear doctrines** would also help reduce ambiguities and contribute to stability. Let me underline that such exchanges are not only valuable among NWS, but also and particularly between NWS and NNWS. Last not least, **declaratory restraint** is a resource to be fully exploited. We encourage NWS to examine all options to **reaffirm or tighten existing NSAs** and find ways to **reduce the role of nuclear weapons** in their strategies and doctrines.

- Legally binding arrangements on **Nuclear Weapon Free Zones** are instrumental in enhancing regional security, solidifying the NPT non-proliferation commitments and building confidence between NWS and NNWS. We encourage efforts to clear the way for **signing the Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok** by all NWS. We are committed to the establishment of a **zone free of WMD and their means of delivery in the Middle East** on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among all States of the region.

- Germany remains fully attached to the **goal of ultimately achieving a world free of nuclear weapons**. That vision needs to be worked on, notably by developing and testing **robust and credible verification procedures**. For a world without nuclear weapons can neither be achieved nor can it be stable without effective multilateral disarmament verification. That is why **Germany and France** are jointly hosting a **verification exercise** in September – “NuDiVe”. We support the valuable work undertaken in the framework of the **IPNDV** and the Group of Governmental Experts on Verification.

- On FMCT and CTBT we have been biding time for far too long. It is high time that we remove the obstacles and start negotiations on a **Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty**. Differences on certain aspects of an FMCT must no longer serve as a pretext not to move forward. I would also like to renew our call on all States that have not signed and ratified the **Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty** to do
so without further delay. We all agree: Nuclear testing should be a thing of the past, and the critical role of the CTBTO in detecting DPRK’s nuclear tests can hardly be overrated.

- Let me also commend the IAEA and express our highest appreciation for the Agency's invaluable work. Germany remains fully committed to the right of all NPT States Parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, science and technology, which includes the freedom of every country to decide on its own energy mix. Given the inherent risks and long-term costs nuclear power production incurs Germany has taken the decision to phase out nuclear power generation by 2022. Nonetheless, Germany will continue to play an active role in the area of decommissioning and nuclear waste management, technology as well as research and knowledge management.

- Germany, like other countries, attaches utmost importance to applying the highest safety and security principles to nuclear energy and technology. While upholding these principles primarily remains a national responsibility, we strongly support the role of the IAEA in further developing safety standards and security guidelines with a view to their universalization and promoting international cooperation in that field.

- Germany is, at present, the fourth largest contributor to the IAEA’s budget and has been operating its IAEA safeguards support program for 40 years. We are also a major contributor to the Nuclear Security fund given the risks of nuclear and radioactive material falling out of regulatory control, nuclear smuggling and nuclear terrorism. Germany also continues to actively contribute to the advancement of nuclear science and technology in a wide variety of applications, including health, the environment, water, food and agriculture. Notwithstanding our decision to forgo nuclear power production, we remain fully and actively committed to the NPT’s third pillar.
Mr Chairman,

- Leading the Review Cycle to a successful outcome will require our **whole-hearted diplomatic commitment**, a sense of realism and a bit of restraint on all sides. While our priorities differ, one thing is clear: The **NPT is viable only as a whole, with three equally important pillars**: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Together, these commitments form the basis for the almost **universal support** to that treaty.

- I am convinced that it will be **possible to renew fully-fledged support** to the NPT next year, laying the ground for its future. At the beginning of the month Foreign Minister Maas, chairing the **UN Security Council**, convened a meeting in **support of the NPT**. Different positions notwithstanding, it was encouraging to see all members of the Council underline the enduring value of the NPT and all its commitments.

- Mr Chairman,

  We should use this momentum to endorse as early as possible the designated RevCon chair to steer us to a successful outcome of the next year's RevCon.