



ITALY

2019 NPT PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

CLUSTER I

**STATEMENT BY
H.E. AMBASSADOR GIANFRANCO INCARNATO**

**PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ITALY
TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT**

New York, 29 APRIL - 10 MAY 2019

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Mr. Chair,

Italy aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union. I would like to add some remarks in my national capacity.

Mr. Chair,

Italy fully shares the goal of a peaceful and secure world free of nuclear weapons. Our utmost concern for the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons' use underpins our efforts for effective progress on nuclear disarmament.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains the overarching norm on which all nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures are based. Disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes.

Through its Article VI, the NPT provides the only realistic legal framework to attain a world without nuclear weapons, in a way that promotes international stability and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.

Italy is convinced that the goal of a nuclear weapon free world can be attained only through a progressive approach, based on concrete and effective measures, resulting in an effective, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament.

Also, we remain convinced that any process that can effectively lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons requires the substantive and constructive involvement of all relevant actors, in a perspective based on the research for consensus.

Mr. Chair,

In our view, most of the practical and effective measures, both legal and non-legal, needed to implement Art. VI of the NPT are already embodied in relevant actions of the 2010 Action Plan, whose full implementation we continue to support.

Among these, the prompt entry into force of the "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty" remains one of our key priorities. As 2018 Chair of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, we focused our efforts on outreach. We also continue to call upon all States that have not yet done so – in particular the remaining eight Annex-2 States – to sign and ratify the Treaty without any further delay. In the meantime, we call upon all States to respect the moratorium on nuclear test explosions and to refrain from any action that could undermine the objectives and purpose of the Treaty.

Another key priority for Italy remains the immediate commencement, within the CD, of negotiations of a Treaty dealing with fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We welcome the report of the High Level Expert Preparatory Group established by UNGA Resolution 71/259, as well as the in-depth discussions that were held in the relevant Subsidiary Body of the CD in 2018. Both have provided fruitful inputs that we should build on in our negotiations of a fissile material treaty within the CD. Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, we call upon all relevant States to abide by a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

We also support the resumption of substantive discussions on Negative Security Assurances, within the context of a comprehensive and balanced program of work, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all their aspects, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument.

Italy also values all initiatives undertaken in the field of nuclear disarmament verification, as important tools to build trust and confidence among nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States. In this regard, we support the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and welcome the consensual report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification, pursuant UNGA Resolution n. 71/67, which we co-sponsored.

Mr. Chair,

Nuclear-weapon States bear fundamental responsibilities for the implementation of Art. VI of the NPT. While welcoming the reductions made so far by most of them, we encourage them to seek further reductions in their nuclear arsenals.

We greatly welcomed the announcement by the Russian Federation and the United States that they met the central limits of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in February 2018. We believe that the preservation of the New Start Treaty is essential to international stability; for this reason, we encourage/ the Russian Federation and the United States to extend the Treaty, and to pursue further discussions on confidence-building, transparency, verification activities, and reporting. We also strongly encourage them to negotiate a follow-on instrument covering additional US and Russian systems.

We encourage all activities and discussions among nuclear-weapon States aimed at building mutual trust, enhancing transparency and reducing risk, thus contributing to create an environment more conducive to further nuclear disarmament. Several practical measures can help avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation, thus contributing to greater security and stability. These could include transparency and dialogue on nuclear doctrines and postures; military to military dialogues; hotline agreements among relevant States, “accident measure” agreements, transparency and notification exercises as well as missile launch notification and other data exchange agreements.

Other effective practical measures are the reduction by nuclear-weapon States of the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines, and policies, as well as the further reduction of the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security. Continued engagement by nuclear-weapon States to respect fully their commitments with regard to security assurances, and to extend them if they have not yet done so, will also be fundamental.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.