

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

**Statement by  
Head of the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran  
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Permanent Representative to the UN and other International organizations in Vienna**

***Specific Issues of Cluster III: Other Provisions of the Treaty***

**Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of 2020 Review Conference of the  
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
Geneva, 3 May 2018**

Mr. Chairman,

Achieving full universality of the NPT continues to be a formidable challenge. All States parties have commitment to make every effort to achieve the universality of the Treaty and to refrain from any action that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty. However, it appears from the actions and policies of certain nuclear-weapon States that, in practice, they have put aside this commitment and no longer honor it, either for geopolitical interests or alliance considerations or because of viewing the goal of universality as unrealistic.

They reward the nuclear armed non-parties with nuclear cooperation and trade in nuclear power reactors. They continue to provide a great deal of economic and military aid to the only non-party to the NPT in the Middle East region. With this kind of aid, the Israeli regime has afforded to run its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities at which it produces the plutonium for its underground nuclear weapons program. Such irresponsible policies and actions indeed have significantly undermined the prospects for the achievement of universality of the Treaty in the Middle East.

Iran recommends the 2020 Review Conference to recognize that non-adherence to the NPT undermines its objectives, and thus pose a threat to international peace and security; to urge the non-parties to accede, promptly, unconditionally and as non-nuclear-weapon parties to the NPT; to recognize that unsafeguarded nuclear facilities of the non-parties to the Treaty and providing nuclear cooperation and assistance to them by certain nuclear-weapon States threaten the peace and security in particular in the Middle East; to reaffirm the commitment of all States parties to cease and prohibit completely the transfer or sharing of any nuclear related equipment, information, material, facilities, resources or devices, or the extension of scientific and technical assistance in the nuclear field to nonparties to the treaty without exception.

In article X, the Treaty is very explicit in terms of the right of its States parties to withdrawal. It recognizes the existence of the unconditional right of a State party to withdraw in exercising its national sovereignty.

So far, the right of withdrawal has been employed only one time, and ironically, as a result of intimidation, pressure and threats against the withdrawing Party by a certain nuclear-weapon State. Withdrawal clause creates a lawful, public mechanism for a State party to terminate its treaty obligations and withdraw from the membership in the treaty in specific circumstances.

The sovereign right of States parties to withdraw should not be challenged, constrained or conditioned. Phraseology of the article X of the NPT has left determination of the existence of the extraordinary events completely to the discretion of the withdrawing State.

In conclusion, the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates that should the letter and spirit of the Treaty are not observed in all its aspects, the benefits and incentives for the non-nuclear-weapon States to stay as Parties of the Treaty will reduce. Unfortunately, wrong signals have been sent by some nuclear weapon States to this end. It seems that being a State Party to the NPT, implementing Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement and even applying Additional Protocol and in some cases accepting more monitoring and limitations have no benefits. On the contrary, in practice being outside of the NPT, running unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, testing nuclear explosion and producing nuclear weapons are welcomed and would bring a lot of benefits including nuclear cooperation. In our view, the most effective way to prevent future withdrawal from NPT is to work jointly to ensure full implementation of all provisions of the Treaty, with no selectivity, double standards or discriminatory approaches.

Thank you.