Mr. Chairman,

Poland fully associates itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union within the framework of Cluster II.

I would like also to draw attention to the working documents issued by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative that are relevant to the subject of nuclear non-proliferation, especially presented this year Working Paper no 29 entitled “Nuclear safeguards standards under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

At the same time, allow me to add couple of remarks in my national capacity.

Mr. Chairman,

The world continues to face major proliferation challenges that represent one of the gravest threats to international peace and security. Although the darkest scenarios from the past, envisaging that more than 25 countries will be in possession of nuclear weapons has not materialized, the present danger of nuclear proliferation did not evaporated at all. The possible proliferation of nuclear technologies and capabilities, to state and non-state actors, and its consequences, still are to be seriously concern about, and need our sustained attention and engagement.
The most prominent example is the DPRK. Despite encouraging diplomatic prospects in recent days, North Korea's efforts to enhance its nuclear and ballistic capabilities remain the main point of concern for the global non-proliferation regime. The development of DPRK's illegal nuclear and ballistic missile programmes challenge the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. They are in clear violation and flagrant disregard of its international obligations, as expressed in numerous UN Security Council Resolutions. The DPRK must comply with its international obligations and abandon without delay its nuclear capabilities, ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction programmes in complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

In this respect the DPRK's declaration on halting nuclear and intercontinental missile tests must be followed through. We hope that the Inter Korean Summit decisions will be implemented contributing to reaching an agreement on denuclearisation of the DPRK and deescalating tensions in the region.

The situation in the Middle East, with prolonged stalemate regarding the process of creation of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, is also of our concern. Poland remains committed to establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. We regret that it was not possible to convene the conference as foreseen by the outcome document from the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The only sustainable way forward to agree on the arrangements for a meaningful conference is through dialogue and confidence building among all the stakeholders.

Mr. Chairman,
The full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by all parties is necessary as a contribution to regional peace and security. In our view the JCPOA remains the best available mechanism to assure international community the civilian nature of the Iran’s nuclear program. In this regard we welcome the IAEA efforts to strictly monitor and verify Iran’s commitments.

On a broader scale Poland believes in strong verification regimes that can build trust, increase confidence and transparency. In this regard the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in securing non-proliferation obligations under art. III of the NPT is crucial for the credibility of the Treaty. The IAEA safeguards help to create environment conducive to safe and predictable nuclear cooperation. The Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements (CSA) together with the Additional Protocol are essential instruments for establishing a solid verification standards. We call on all States, who have not done so, to conclude, sign and ratify the Additional Protocol without delay.

Mr. Chairman,

For many years Poland has been actively involved in combating proliferation risks. Our Chairmanship in the NPT and efforts to make it effective and credible is yet another testimony of our ongoing commitments. Moreover by assuming the Chairmanship of the Hague Code of Conduct against proliferation of the ballistic missiles (HCoC) for the period of 2017-2018 we clearly demonstrated not only our serious engagement in this regard, but also that mutually linked proliferation of nuclear technologies and ballistic missile did not escape from our security radar.
Poland is strongly committed to uphold the highest standards of export controls and strives for optimal transparency in this field. Suitable and effective export controls mechanism should be adhered to by all countries involved in nuclear trade for peaceful purposes, in order to maintain the appropriate level of trustworthy control of nuclear and dual use goods and technologies. We encourage all countries to adhere to the export control guidelines of the Zangger Committee and Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG).

In conclusion, let me reiterate that Poland is highly attached to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime as this fundamentally contributes to international peace, stability and security.

Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for your attention.