



Kingdom of the Netherlands

Statement of the Netherlands

delivered by

**H.E. Robbert Gabriëlse, Permanent Representative to the
Conference on Disarmament**

at

**Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the
2020 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty**

on

Cluster II, Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Geneva, 27 April 2018

Thank you Mr Chair,

The Netherlands aligns itself with the statement delivered by the EU and would like to make some remarks in its national capacity.

Safeguards/ Nuclear Verification

The three pillars of the NPT are interlinked and mutually enabling. Guaranteeing adherence to non-proliferation obligations both enables the sharing of technologies for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and is complementary to nuclear disarmament efforts. Perhaps most importantly of all, assuring non-proliferation is essential to reaching our ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

The safeguards system established under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) based on Article III NPT, is a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and plays an indispensable role in ensuring compliance with the NPT. We would like to draw your attention to the NPDI working paper on the safeguards standard of Article III. It emphasizes that the current standard of safeguards is the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement supplemented by an Additional Protocol. We stand ready to assist other Member States and the IAEA with the practical development of safeguards. Therefore, among other things, the Netherlands has been funding the IAEA Member State Support Programme for nuclear verification with EUR 100.000,- per year.

The Netherlands fully supports the further development of safeguards methodology in general and in that regard of the state level approach in particular.

We encourage the IAEA to keep modernising its way of working with regard to safeguards implementation, be it through technical and scientific modernisation or by improving efficiency and effectiveness through better analysis.

Mr. Chair,

We have all witnessed the value of a robust nuclear verification regime on several accounts.

Iran

A clear example of the importance of strong nuclear verification is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. With the JCPOA Iran is – in the words of the IAEA – subject to the world's most robust verification regime. In its ten reports since Implementation Day, the IAEA has confirmed that it has been able to verify Iran's nuclear-related obligations under the JCPOA.

The Netherlands firmly believes the JCPOA represents a significant gain for nuclear verification in Iran and urges all parties to continue to fully implement the JCPOA's provisions.

DPRK

On the other hand we remain extremely concerned by the DPRK's development of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and we strongly condemn the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile tests, which represent a clear threat to the region, as well as to international peace and stability. The latest statement of the DPRK to suspend nuclear testing is encouraging. We call on the DPRK to refrain from further missile and nuclear testing in order to allow the diplomatic consultations to bear fruit, and to return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards regime. The goal of these efforts can only be complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Syria

In 2011 the IAEA Board of Governors concluded that Syria's undeclared construction of a nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour and failure to provide design information for this facility constituted non-compliance with Syria's obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement. Syria still has to provide this information. We call on Syria to cooperate with the IAEA, clarify matters with regard to Dair Alzour and the other relevant sites without delay and to sign and ratify an Additional Protocol as soon as possible.

CTBT

The CTBT constitutes a core element of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, in addition to its contribution to nuclear disarmament. A legally binding and verifiable end to nuclear weapons testing will form a giant hurdle for the development of nuclear weapons.

We continue to support strongly the development of the CTBT's world-class verification system. It has demonstrated its value by immediately and accurately detecting the nuclear tests conducted by the DPRK, proving its unique ability to provide independent and reliable data, something that no single country alone could do. We call on all States signatories to support the completion of the International Monitoring System.

In light of the CTBT's importance for –inter alia- nuclear non-proliferation It is therefore of the utmost importance that the CTBT enter into force as soon as possible. We urge all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay, in particular the eight Annex 2 States, whose ratification is necessary for the CTBT's entry into force.

I would also like to refer to the recommendations contained in the Vienna Group of Ten Working Paper.

Export Controls

The Netherlands is strongly committed to upholding the highest standards of export controls and strives for optimal transparency in this field. Export controls are a fundamental part of the implementation of Articles I and II, as they help ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes is not directly or indirectly used for the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We call on all States to adhere to and effectively apply export control mechanisms, in full conformity with the object and purposes of Articles I, II and III of the NPT.

Security Council resolution 1540 makes an important contribution in this regard, as it requires all UN member states to establish and maintain appropriate effective export controls.

WMD Free zone – Middle East

Finally, Mr Chair, the Netherlands would like to express its unequivocal support for the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East; we call on all States in the region to engage in a spirit of cooperation that will allow the organisation of a conference on this issue. We suggest that the relevant paragraphs in the 2017 PrepCom summary form a starting point for this discussion.

Thank you Mr Chair.