

NPT Prep Com 2018 – Cluster II – Statement by Sweden

Mr. Chair,

Sweden aligns itself with the statement made by the European Union under this cluster. Our general priorities are also reflected in the comprehensive working papers prepared by the European Union and the Vienna Group of Ten. In addition, I would like to make the following remarks in a national capacity.

Mr. Chair,

During the past years the world has been alarmed at the persistent, illegal and dangerous nuclear weapon ambitions of DPRK, including development of ballistic missiles of intercontinental range. Recent diplomatic efforts offer a glimmer of hope and have somewhat decreased the immediate risk of miscalculations. Now, these encouraging gestures need to be followed up by concrete action. The DPRK must abandon its nuclear weapons and missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and come into compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement.

Mr. Chair,

The JCPOA was achieved through tough and skillful diplomatic bargaining. It constitutes a part of the global non-proliferation architecture which we cannot afford to lose. The EU and Sweden remain

firm in its support of this agreement and we expect all parties to continue to fully implement it. A failure in this regard would be seriously detrimental for regional and global security. The JCPOA makes it possible for the IAEA to apply its most intrusive safeguards. This, in turn gives us confidence in IAEA's assessment that Iran continues to fulfill its nuclear obligations under the agreement. This year, Sweden has pledged another 300 000 euro of extra-budgetary contributions towards IAEA verification pursuant to the JCPOA. Another critical confidence-building step would be a prompt Iranian ratification of the Additional Protocol. Iran's role in the region as well as missile activities are distinct matters of considerable concern. As such, they need to be addressed separately and not at the expense of the JPCOA.

Mr. Chair,

The JCPOA also underlines the central role of the IAEA in upholding non-proliferation obligations under the NPT, and the Additional Protocol as an indispensable tool. In times as these, when more States are developing nuclear energy, it should together with the comprehensive safeguards agreement, be considered the current verification standard pursuant to article III of the Treaty. It is high time for States that have not already done so to conclude an Additional Protocol.

Mr. Chair,

Sweden is a strong supporter of effective verification. More than 30 years of Swedish contributions to the IAEA safeguards support program

testify to this. Robust verification will be needed when nuclear weapons decrease in number and for upholding a world free of nuclear weapons. That is why we are engaged in initiatives such as the IPNDV and the QUAD – initiatives that can further verification methods and technologies for nuclear verification disarmament. Such cooperative efforts, bringing together nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, also contribute to transparency and build trust. And that is why we encourage both States with nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapon States to engage in this work.

Mr. Chair,

Nuclear security and nuclear terrorism remain global challenges. Sweden is actively involved in the Global Partnership. We cooperate with several Eastern European countries to assist in upgrading nuclear security and prevention of nuclear terrorism. We support the IAEA's work on nuclear security and we have since 2010 contributed with more than half a million euro to its trust fund. Sweden strongly supports UN Security Council resolution 1540, which serves as an important complement to the non-proliferation regime. As a member of the UN Security Council we are currently one of the vice-chairs of this committee.

All nuclear and radioactive materials need to be protected. This includes military material. We call on all states that possess nuclear weapons to increase transparency and confidence in the effective security of such material.

Mr. Chair,

Another global challenge is the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. Voluntary arrangements can increase transparency and build confidence. In this regard, Sweden is pleased to take on the chairmanship of the Hague Code of Conduct in May this year. Our priorities as chair will be to;

1. Pursue universalization of the code
2. Improve implementation of subscribing states - both regarding pre-launch notifications and annual reports.
3. Ensure wide support for this year's resolution on the code in the UN General Assembly.

I thank you Mr. Chair.